translation, has not sought to reflect the balance which is so characteristic of prose of this period and so often a valuable clue to the sequence and relation of ideas: 'Wisdom possesses a mirror which probes the deepest subtleties, but there is no active knowing in it. Spirit possesses a function of responding to occasions, but there is no active thought in it.' As to the wisdom of the sage which is the subject of the first sentence, the word chih may have meant Prajñā to Sēng-chao, but I think there is little doubt that it also meant wisdom as the term had long been used in native Chinese philosophies, e.g. Lao-tzŭ 19, Hsün-tzŭ 17, chi-chieh 11.14b. The text of the latter runs 大智在所不慮 and may be translated 'Great wisdom consists in what one gives no active thought to.' In this passage, as Dubs rightly remarks, Hsün-tzŭ is obviously under Taoist influence. I suggest that the metaphor of the mirror comes from Chuang-tzŭ 7.11, which means 'The perfection of the wise man is like a mirror.' The expression 窮曲 seems first to occur in the commentary to the I-ching by the 4th Century neo-Taoist Han Po 韓伯 (I-ching 7.4a) where it is used to explain the capacity of the I for penetrating to the roots of all phenomena. The paired phrases 'no active knowing' and 'no active thought' seems to me to echo the passage in Chuang-tzŭ 22: 冤思无慮始知知道 which Legge (Texts of Taoism II. 58) renders: 'To exercise no thought and no anxious consideration is the first step towards knowing the Tao.' Though the phrase 應會 has something of a Buddhist flavor, I doubt if it meant much more to Seng-chao and his contemporaries than 應時 in the expression 應時而変者也; 'to change according to time' in Chuang-tzŭ's discussion of temporal adaptation. (Chuang-tzŭ 14, Legge, op. cit. I. 353).

This entire passage deals with the capacities of the sage. It is his wisdom and his spirit which are being described, and the whole could easily be described as a pure neo-Taoist discussion of a favorite neo-Taoist subject. If Dr. Liebenthal had developed his exegesis on his own excellent dictum '.', . . . pure Buddhist philosophers did not exist in the fifth century A.D.' (41), a number of obscurities would have been cleared up and the Chao-lun given its proper place in the development of Chinese thought as well as in the development of Buddhist thought in China.

But despite technical errors and the defects in interpretation which I have discussed, Dr. Liebenthal's book is of the greatest usefulness and importance. It is worthy of the closest study by anyone interested in Chinese history and Chinese thought.

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This publication represents a real labor of love. In 1924 Wilhelm's translation of the ancient Chinese classic first appeared in German, the product of nearly ten years' effort. Baynes, at the suggestion of Jung, then undertook to translate this German version into English, and though he had not proceeded far before Wilhelm's death in 1930, he later received valuable aid from the latter's son, Hellmut Wilhelm, a well known sinologist in his own right. Finally, the Bollingen Foundation made possible the publication of the completed work by including it in its Series, incidentally giving it an exceptionally handsome format. Why,' asks the English translator in his Translator's Note, prepare a 'translation of a translation' and thereby 'risk the danger of a double distortion of a text?' The reply is that 'however many other translations of this book [the I Ching]

1 Particularly attractive is the two-color title-page, faced by a Chinese title-page written in archaic characters by the archaeologist Tung Tsa-pin. The only major typographical error noticed by the reviewer is the inversion of the Chinese character for hexagram 52 which occurs in vol. II, p. 301.
may appear, . . . Wilhelm's will remain unique, both by reason of his relation to the I Ching and because of the background out of which his translation grew. This statement, as well as Mr. Baynes' own efforts, are undoubtedly both justified by the published results. Though the reviewer has unfortunately not had Wilhelm's German translation available for comparison, he is convinced, on the basis of spot checks between the English version and the original text of the I Ching in Chinese, that Mr. Baynes has succeeded admirably in keeping to the meaning of Wilhelm's German while at the same time producing idiomatic English. In some respects, indeed, his work is an improvement over the German, for it contains numerous new notes which give it added clarity.

Now that Wilhelm's work has appeared in English dress, it inevitably invites comparison with the other major translation of the I Ching in English, that by James Legge in Sacred Books of the East, vol. 16. The differences between the two are often striking. Legge's version tends to be more wordy, more stiff and more prosaic; that by Wilhelm to be more concise, more free and more imaginative. On the whole there is little doubt that Wilhelm has better succeeded in capturing the spirit and meaning of the original—not because he was superior to Legge as a Chinese scholar, but because his turn of mind enabled him to have a greater degree of sympathetic insight into this particular kind of text. This is not to say that his rendering is not open to question at many points. Such questioning is inevitable in the translation of any ancient text, but particularly one like the I Ching, which being in large measure a text of divination, is ipso facto full of oracular ambiguities and double entendre.2

If we turn from Wilhelm's opus as a translation to examine it from the point of view of scientific scholarship, two main criticisms emerge. The first concerns his arrangement of the material. The I Ching, as is well known, consists of two disparate sections: an original corpus, consisting of brief descriptions of the sixty-four hexagrams and their individual lines; and a much later series of 'commentaries' known as the 'Ten Wings' (Legge's 'Seven Appendices'). Legge rightly stressed the fact that unless these two parts are kept distinct, a proper understanding of the I Ching is made difficult; he accordingly maintained this division throughout his translation.

Wilhelm, on the contrary, chops up the Appendices wherever possible by taking the sentences from each which pertain to any hexagram and grouping them under that hexagram in sequence to the similarly relevant sentences belonging to the original corpus. The whole is interlarded with Wilhelm's own lengthy commentary and is arranged in an unusual sequence: In vol. I the original corpus is combined with a portion of Appendix II, plus Wilhelm's comments, containing 'digests of the most important Chinese commentaries'; all this is then followed by Appendices V and III in that order. In vol. II the original corpus is repeated, but this time combined with the remaining portion of Appendix II, as well as with Appendices I, IV, VI and VII. This procedure involves considerable repetition, not only in

has reference to the act of allotting or distributing, i.e., 'dividing,' something among a series of persons or objects. The difficulties exemplified by this single word are typical of those constantly confronting the translator of such a text as the I Ching.

(2) Wilhelm's translation (I, 320) of one of the most famous I Ching statements in Appendix III (Legge's numbering) is: 'As continuer, it is good. As compiler, it is the essence.' This is not as accurate as Legge's version (op. cit., 356): 'That which ensues as the result (of their movement) is goodness; that which shows it in its completeness is the natures (of men and things)—the latter part of which, however, could in turn be advantageously emended to read: . . . that which completes it is the natures. . . .'

(3) It is unfortunate that Wilhelm, instead of retaining the important metaphorical terms yin and yang as technical expressions, chooses to translate them ambiguously as the dark and the light, e.g., in I, 319. This is especially confusing in this passage, because in the passage immediately preceding (I, 316), Wilhelm uses the identical terms dark and light to translate two entirely different words, yu 明 and ming 明, which in no way have the metaphorical connotations of yin and yang.

2 Space here permits citation of only three examples:

(1) Lines 2, 4 and 6 of hexagram 3 contain an identical formula translated by Wilhelm (I, 17 and 19) as: 'Horse and wagon part.' Pan 畏, however, the word here rendered as 'part,' possesses several different meanings according to its context, among them: (a) 'to be displayed, arranged, or set forth.' This seems best to fit the context here. (b) In certain military contexts it may mean — though this seems less likely here — 'to withdraw or retire.' It is rendered accordingly by Legge (op. cit., 62-3) as 'return' in line 2, and 'retreat' in lines 4 and 6. (c) Wilhelm's translation as 'part' seems definitely incorrect. It apparently derives from a mistaken understanding of the gloss 'to divide' which is given in the dictionaries for pan in certain contexts. As so used, however, it does not mean 'to divide' in the sense of 'to separate or draw apart.' Actually it
the translations but to a lesser extent in Wilhelm’s comments as well. More important, it blurs the distinctions that might otherwise be analyzed between the various strata of differing materials.

A second criticism concerns Wilhelm’s dating and attribution of these materials. He sees ‘no reason to challenge’ the tradition that the original corpus was composed by King Wen, founder of the Chou dynasty, and his son, the Duke of Chou. As for the Appendices, he likewise finds ‘no reason for doubting’ the traditional ascription of the first to Confucius; the second he considers as ‘in very close proximity to Confucius’; the third he believes contains ‘traditional material of the Confucian school, dating from various periods’; the fourth likewise has ‘very valuable material deriving from the Confucian school’; the fifth probably embodies ‘many fragments antedating Confucius and treated in commentary by him or by his school’; as to the sixth and seventh he says only that the former ‘has nothing to do with Confucius.’

Some of these ascriptions had already been strongly doubted by Legge forty years earlier, and since 1924 (when Wilhelm’s translation appeared) they have been widely rejected by Chinese and Western scholars alike. Today, indeed, critical opinion tends to the conclusion that the I Ching’s position in the thinking of Confucius and his immediate followers was no more than negligible, that it did not become firmly a part of the Confucian canon until the last two or three centuries B.C., and that it was at some time during this latter period that the Appendices came to be written. Wilhelm, of course, cannot be held responsible for his ignorance of these opinions which were developed later. Yet inasmuch as his version will now be read by many English-speaking people to whom the classic has hitherto been unknown, it is decidedly unfortunate that his English translator has not seen fit to present to such readers the results of recent scholarship.

Perhaps it may seem to some like quibbling to insist overmuch upon this point, since the I Ching did after all subsequently enter the Confucian canon. Nevertheless it has some importance for the manner in which we are to evaluate the book, as well as, more generally, the entire early development of Chinese thought. Thus, once we recognize the fact that the original corpus is primarily a divination text, and that true philosophical speculation probably began in China only centuries after it had been written, the likelihood then becomes remote of finding in it any very profound and systematic philosophy, no matter how much we may hope to find such philosophy in the later Appendices. This viewpoint runs sharply counter to that of Wilhelm, for whom corpus and Appendices alike constitute a profound source of ‘ancient Chinese wisdom.’

And in the second place, the fact that the Appendices were composed later than traditionally supposed and have no direct connection with Confucius means that in important respects they probably represent secondary reflections, rather than primary stimuli, of the leading currents of thought in ancient China. This point of view again runs counter to Wilhelm’s reiterated thesis that ‘both of the two branches of Chinese philosophy, Confucianism and Taoism, have their common roots here’ (I, xxvii).

In short, the net result of the new critical approach is to de-emphasize the importance of the I Ching as far as the early development of Chinese thought is concerned, though continuing to recognize that importance for subsequent developments.

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5 See I, xxxix. Though this portion of the text may quite possibly date from the general period of these two men, their actual authorship of it should be suspect not only on account of the widely recognized proclivity of the early Chinese to attribute important writings to their ancient sages for prestige purposes, but also in view of our present day knowledge of the manner in which ghost-writers commonly operate on behalf of over-burdened statesmen.


7 See esp. Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., 383 ff., in which the indebtedness of the Appendices to Confucianism and particularly Taoism is repeatedly illustrated.

8 It is the reviewer’s own opinion that this later influence has in important respects been harmful rather than beneficial. Thus on the metaphysical level, later dogmatic acceptance of the I Ching’s yi-yang theory (as subsequently synthesized with the theory of the Five Elements and a complex system of numerology) has tended to freeze the Chinese attitude toward the universe and thereby hinder the development of science. On the sociological level, likewise, this same theory has tended to freeze the social status quo by reinforcing the
In spite of these criticisms, there is every reason to believe that this new English version of the Chinese classic, judged as a piece of translation, will for a long time to come remain the best available to the English-speaking world.

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Bali: Rangda and Barong. By Jane Belo.

The materials presented in this little book were gathered by the author, while resident in Bali from 1931 to 1939.

The first section deals with Balinese society—its psychological and cultural makeup and its ecological setting. Despite its primitive background, its long period of Hindu domination, its contacts with Arabs, Chinese, and Dutch, Bali still presents a definite social structure. Hindu-Javanese life—such as existed in the 14th century kingdom of Madjapahit—is reflected in the presence of caste, princes and priests, artisans, musicians and dancers. Nevertheless, old Indonesian ideas are sufficiently strong to override caste when it conflicts with village duties and responsibilities. Ancestor worship of ancient times has been merged with gods and practices of Hinduism. Brahman and Buddhist priests carry out rites undisturbed by the presence of mediums of early Malayan tradition. Hindu places of worship are held in high esteem, but in no manner do they replace the temporary shrines at which local demons are placated.

Out of this merger of old and new two aggressive and destructive forces—Barong and Rangda—emerge. These are dramatized by masked dancers who go through ‘patterned behavior in a somnambulistic state’ which, according to the author, relieves restraints, fears, and general inhibiting patterning of Balinese emotional life.

The meaning and identification of these two figures form the subject matter of most of the balance of the volume.

The author challenges the idea of Bateson and Mead that Barong is the father image and Rangda the mother. She considers the suggestion that Rangda may be the figure of Fear, or that she may be Durgâ, the wife of Śiva, in her dread aspect. There is also the assumption that she may be the mother of the fabled king Erlangga, whereas Barong can be seen as the personification of the powers of white magic. An alternate hypothesis would derive the masked figure of Rangda out of Durgâ worship, and Barong out of Buddhist practices. The discussion of these views is rather involved and of interest primarily to students of Hindu-Javanese times and ceremonies.

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Professor Buck is to be congratulated upon the completion of this project, which has occupied much of his attention for at least thirty-five years. It was announced to scholars in an article published in Language 5.215-18 (1929), after a “considerable” amount of work had been accomplished by the author himself, by paid assistants, colleagues, and students. We are nowhere told just how old the plan is; but it must have been clearly formulated before 1915, since Buck’s article on Words of Speaking and Saying in the Indo-European Languages, published in AJP 36.1-18, 125-54 (1915), reappears here in Chapter 18, with scarcely more alteration than was found necessary